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ABSTRACT
The third general standard of fieldwork requires auditors to maintain a skeptical mindset
with regards to the collection and critical assessment of audit evidence. While professional
skepticism is frequently referenced by professional standards, a lack of precision in defining the
concept presumably leads to variation in how skepticism is exercised in practice. Drawing on
theories from the fields of psychology, economics and organizational justice, this dissertation
considers different perspectives of what constitutes sufficient professional skepticism and
examines how those perspectives differ between audit practitioners and regulators.
First, I consider competing perspectives of professional skepticism – neutral versus
presumptive doubt – and whether asking auditors to adopt alternative perspectives of skepticism
may have implications for audit efficiency and effectiveness. While, too little skepticism may
endanger audit effectiveness and lead to audit failure or enforcement action, too much skepticism
may arguably lead to unnecessary costs and inefficiency.
Second, I consider whether the nature of the auditor-client relationship threatens an
auditor’s ability to maintain an attitude of professional skepticism. For example, theoretical
perspectives from the fields of psychology and economics suggest that auditors may, consciously
or unconsciously, be less skeptical of clients with whom they have developed close, positive
working relationships or financial dependencies. More specifically, I consider whether skeptical
behavior is impeded by management who display low-risk attitudes towards fraud or by client’s
who are considered to be highly important to the profitability of the local office.
Finally, I examine how professional skepticism is defined from a regulator’s perspective.
When a public company is accused of fraudulent financial reporting, regulators may determine
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that the audit performed on the fraudulent financial statements was deficient. Prior research has
suggested that in such cases, insufficient skepticism is often a leading cause of alleged audit
failure. Within a fairness theory framework, this study examines enforcement actions against
auditors between 1999 and 2009, and identifies certain factors that are associated with a citation
for a lack of professional skepticism. Overall, results suggest that regulators approach the issue
by determining whether auditors should have been more skeptical. Factors found to affect this
determination include whether the auditor was perceived as having been aware of an elevated
risk of fraud or whether the client was accused of having provided the auditor with false or
misleading information during the course of their investigation.
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INTRODUCTION
Maintaining an attitude of skepticism has long been recognized in the auditing profession
as a requisite ingredient in exercising due professional care, as mandated by SAS No. 1, Due
Professional Care in the Performance of Work (AICPA, 1972). The concept of professional
skepticism is pervasive throughout auditing standards, which invoke skepticism as a necessary
component of planning and performing the audit (SAS No. 109), reviewing confirmations (SAS
No. 67), evaluating management estimates (SAS No. 57), and considering the risk of fraudulent
financial reporting (SAS No. 99). Regulators have further highlighted the role of skepticism in
maintaining auditor objectivity and independence (PCAOB, 2007; CAQ 2011) and have
regarded “the application of an appropriate degree of professional skepticism as a crucial skill for
auditors (APB, 2010).” Thus, understanding how skepticism influences auditor conduct in
practice is an important issue to both practitioners and regulators. This dissertation examines
some of the issues and challenges that the auditing profession is currently facing with regards to
professional skepticism in theory and in practice.
First of all, as a profession, there is a need for consensus regarding how skepticism
should be defined. Currently, competing perspectives of skepticism can be found in both the
academic literature and auditing standards (Nelson, 2009). As long as there is disagreement
regarding what constitutes skeptical behavior and how much skepticism is considered to be
sufficient, audit education and training is impeded. The primary issue in this disagreement
involves the initial mindset of the auditor, particularly towards management as a source of
information. Some argue that the duty of the auditor is to remain objective and neutral

1

throughout the entire audit (Hurtt, 2010) while others argue that an auditor’s mindset should be
characterized by doubt and distrust from the onset of an engagement (Nelson, 2009).
Although the difference between perspectives may seem nuanced, adopting one
perspective over the other may have significant implications for how auditors plan and conduct
their investigations and how audit evidence is evaluated. There is some evidence to suggest that
adopting a neutral perspective of skepticism results in greater susceptibility to bias in favor of the
client (Bazerman, Morgan and Lowenstein, 1997). On the other hand, adopting a presumptive
doubt perspective may result in excessive skepticism and inefficiency Shaub and Lawrence,
2002; Bell, Peecher and Thomas, 2005; Nelson, 2009). Thus, future research is needed to
examine how auditor judgment and decision making is affected by the way professional
skepticism is defined by audit standards. More specifically, it is important to understand whether
the auditor’s initial skeptical mindset affects the delicate balance between efficiency and
effectiveness, a crucial element of every audit engagement.
A second issue involves the volatile nature of professional skepticism and the many
factors in the audit environment that may threaten an auditor’s ability to behave skeptically. The
relationship between auditor and audit client is particularly challenging because, while important
to audit quality, a positive relationship also creates incentives to compromise objectivity and
skepticism. For example, when an auditor perceives client management to possess a low-risk
attitude towards fraud (e.g. honesty, integrity, etc.) they may be unconsciously biased in favor of
the client’s position (Bazerman, Morgan and Lowenstein, 1997). A similar threat to skepticism
exists when an audit client is very important to the profitability of the audit firm. For fear of
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aggravating or losing an important client, the auditor may be less likely to behave in a skeptical
manner.
Auditing standards require auditors to exercise skepticism during the entire audit,
beginning in the planning stages and continuing through to completion. If skepticism is
compromised during the planning phase of an audit, the auditor may not only be more likely to
favor the client’s position down the road, but may also be less sensitive to factors suggesting a
high risk of fraud. Risk assessments performed during audit planning set the tone for the entire
audit engagement. Therefore, it is important to understand how the auditor-client relationship
impacts an auditor’s ability to behave skeptically.
Finally, the lack of precision in defining the concept and the many threats to professional
skepticism have understandably contributed to some confusion between practitioners and
regulators regarding what constitutes skeptical behavior. Examination of enforcement actions,
filed against auditors for their involvement in cases of alleged fraud, reveals that a lack of
professional skepticism is frequently among the reasons given for the citation (Beasley, Carcello
and Hermanson, 2001; SEC, 2003; Messier, Kozloski and Kochetova-Kozloski, 2010). However,
audit firms have expressed concerns that accusations for a lack of skepticism may be
unwarranted and have argued that the real issue is determining how to demonstrate that they
have been sufficiently skeptical (APB, 2011). Thus, it is important to understand how regulators
determine whether skepticism was insufficient. This information could prove useful to auditors
when developing strategies to increase or more visibly demonstrate skepticism.
Overall, much work is needed to develop and foster professional skepticism in the
auditing profession. To do so, skepticism must first be clearly and consistently defined. It is
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important to also understand the implications of adopting one definition over another to audit
efficiency and effectiveness. Behaviors that constitute professional skepticism should be clearly
identified to improve consistent application and allow for the development of effective training
programs. Furthermore, research must identify threats to professional skepticism and examine
possibilities for mitigating or preventing those threats. Drawing on theories from the fields of
psychology, economics and organizational justice, this dissertation considers different
perspectives of what constitutes sufficient professional skepticism and how those perspectives
might differ between audit practitioners and regulators.
The remainder of the document is organized as follows: Chapter 2 considers competing
perspectives of professional skepticism – neutral versus presumptive doubt – and whether asking
auditors to adopt alternative perspectives of skepticism may have implications for audit
efficiency and effectiveness. Chapter 3 considers whether the nature of the auditor-client
relationship threatens an auditor’s ability to maintain an attitude of professional skepticism.
Chapter 4 examines how skeptical behavior is evaluated from a regulator’s perspective. Chapter
5 presents concluding remarks.
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PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM DEFINED: NEUTRALITY OR
PRESUMPTIVE DOUBT?
“If [an auditor] tends to question the evidence produced by the other ways of knowing until he
has securely established its reliability, skepticism is useful; if he continues to doubt for the sake
of doubting long after a reasonable man would be persuaded by the evidence at hand, skepticism
has been permitted to get out of bounds.” Mautz and Sharaf (1961, p 97)

Introduction
While standards of due professional care define professional skepticism as “an attitude
that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence (AU 230.07),” there
is some disagreement among regulators, practitioners and academics on how professional
skepticism should be exercised in practice. Early auditing standards suggest a neutral approach to
skepticism, while more recent standards seem to promote one of presumptive doubt. From a
neutral perspective, the auditor “does not assume any bias ex ante” (Nelson, 2009, p 3) and can
be thought to evaluate all evidence equally (Hogarth and Einhorn, 1992; Bamber, Ramsay and
Tubbs, 1997). Conversely, a presumptive doubt perspective presumes some level of dishonesty
from client management until sufficient evidence has been collected to suggest otherwise
(Nelson, 2009).
While both perspectives have their strengths, adopting one perspective over the other
may also have consequences for audit efficiency and effectiveness. The remainder of this paper
is organized as follows: First, the differences between the two perspectives of professional
skepticism are discussed. Next, the implications to audit efficiency and effectiveness, of adopting
5

one perspective over the other are considered. Finally, potential avenues for future research are
suggested and concluding remarks are presented.

Perspectives of Professional Skepticism

Neutral Perspective
Authoritative standards have traditionally adopted a neutral perspective of professional
skepticism. For instance, SAS No. 1, Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work
(AICPA, 1972) emphasizes “objective evaluation of audit evidence (AU 230.07).” Therefore, a
neutral auditor adopts an initial mindset towards audit evidence that is unbiased, either favorably
or unfavorably. SAS No. 1 also notes that a skeptical auditor “neither assumes that management
is dishonest nor assumes unquestioned honesty” (AU 230.07-09). Accordingly, this approach has
been regarded as “symmetric” in nature (Nelson, 2009). Hurtt (2010, p 151) takes a neutral
position by defining skepticism as “the propensity of an individual to defer concluding until the
evidence provides sufficient support for one alternative/explanation over others.” Thus, a neutral
auditor also displays a tendency towards a “suspension of judgment” (Hurtt, 2010) by waiting to
determine whether or not a misstatement exists until sufficient competent evidence has been
collected.

Presumptive Doubt Perspective
On the other hand, more recent standards relating to fraud appear to draw on the nonneutral, presumptive doubt perspective (Nelson, 2009). For instance, SAS No. 99, Consideration
of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, proposes that “the auditor should conduct the
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engagement with a mindset that recognizes the possibility that a material misstatement due to
fraud could be present, regardless of any past experience with the entity and regardless of the
auditor’s belief about management’s honesty and integrity.” International Standards on Auditing
(ISA) also highlight a presumptive doubt approach, requiring the auditor to recognize the
possibility of misstatement due to fraud, “notwithstanding the auditor’s past experience of the
honesty and integrity of the entity’s management and those charged with governance (ISA 240,
Paragraph 12).” From this perspective, a skeptical auditor is more sensitive to the risk of
misstatement and presumes some level of dishonesty or bias from management until sufficient
evidence has been collected to suggest otherwise.
References to a presumptive doubt perspective of professional skepticism can also be
found in the academic literature. For example, Nelson (2009, p 4) defines skepticism from the
presumptive doubt perspective “as indicated by auditor judgments and decisions that reflect a
heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is incorrect, conditional on the information
available to the auditor.” Similarly, Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) and McMillan and White (1993)
take a non-neutral approach, where skepticism is viewed as a heightened sensitivity to negative
evidence or evidence that reduces the likelihood of audit failure, respectively.

Implications for Practice

Achieving an optimal balance between efficiency and effectiveness is a vital component
of the audit engagement and is directly impacted by the degree of professional skepticism
exercised. In a discussion paper regarding professional skepticism, the Auditing Practices Board
(APB) points out that “too little skepticism endangers audit effectiveness; too much risks

7

unnecessary cost (APB, 2010).” Based on a recent shift in standards favoring a more
“presumptive doubt” or forensic-auditing mindset over a “neutral” approach (Bell, Peecher and
Thomas, 2005; Nelson, 2009), audit firms and regulators should understand how favoring one
perspective over the other might affect audit cost and quality.
To date, no research has examined how a presumptive doubt approach to professional
skepticism might affect auditor behavior (Nelson, 2009). A link between a lack of professional
skepticism and audit failure (Nelson, 2009), often due to an over-reliance on management
explanations (Feroz, Park and Pastina, 1991; Campbell and Parker, 1992), raises concerns
regarding the effectiveness of the neutral perspective. The presumptive doubt perspective, on the
other hand, raises concerns for cost and efficiency if it results in the performance of excessive or
unnecessary audit procedures.
Effectiveness
As discussed previously, the neutral perspective of skepticism emphasizes a symmetric
approach, particularly with regards to beliefs about the honesty and integrity of management.
Yet, analysis of audit enforcement actions suggests that auditors are often cited for a lack of
professional skepticism due to an over-reliance on the representations of management (Feroz,
Park and Pastina, 1991; Campbell and Parker, 1992). To address this issue, auditing standards
specifically caution that management explanations “should ordinarily be corroborated with other
audit evidence (AU 329.21).” But prior research also finds that auditors often do not confirm
management explanations for unexpected differences (Hirst and Koonce, 1996; Trompeter and
Wright, 2010). Moreover, a failure to corroborate management representations has been
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specifically referenced in the academic literature as a prime example of non-skeptical behavior
(Peecher, 1996; Turner, 2001).
One explanation for a tendency to impulsively accept management explanations is
offered by Bayes’ Theorem, which asserts that the inferential value of information is in part, a
function of the reliability of its source (Bamber, 1983; Hirst, 1994). Consistent with this
prediction, Caster and Pincus (1996) demonstrate that whether management is perceived as a
reliable source of information (e.g. competent, objective and trustworthy) affects the
persuasiveness of audit evidence. Kizirian et al. (2005) propose that when management is
considered less credible, the auditor will either obtain more evidence to offset the credibility
deficiency or require evidence from a more reliable source. As a result, for any given piece of
information, an auditor’s initial mindset towards management as a credible source of information
may have implications for audit effectiveness.
Extensive research has examined the effects of initial hypothesis frame on auditors’
subsequent judgments and decisions. These studies primarily examine auditor’s evidence
evaluation and belief adjustments relative to an initial position that a material error exists in the
client’s financial statements or not. Overall, results indicate that auditors tend to exhibit
confirmation proneness or an increased sensitivity to evidence confirming their initial hypothesis
(e.g., Waller and Felix, 1984; Church, 1990; Smith and Kida, 1991; Bamber, Ramsay and Tubbs,
1997; Beeler and Hunton, 2002). Trompeter and Wright (2010) also find evidence suggesting
that auditors employ a confirmatory strategy when evaluating client-provided explanations.
Thus, confirmation bias theory suggests that initial beliefs about the credibility of management
may impair objectivity and reduce audit effectiveness. For example, if an auditor believes that
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the client is a reliable source of information they may be less skeptical of management
representations, in favor of their initial hypothesis, rather than obtain corroborating evidence or
search for evidence that refutes the client explanation. Thus, the symmetric approach required by
the neutral perspective may be impeded by unconscious, psychological biases which threaten
audit effectiveness.
Efficiency
A presumptive doubt perspective of professional skepticism could mitigate these
concerns due to added emphasis on suspicion towards management as a credible source of
information. Because the presumptive doubt perspective of skepticism is characterized by
asymmetric doubt regarding management as a reliable source of audit evidence (Nelson, 2009),
auditors asked to adopt this perspective may be less susceptible to confirmation bias. However,
an asymmetric approach could raise the bar for the amount of evidence necessary to support an
unqualified audit opinion (Bell, Peecher and Thomas, 2005) and may result in an inefficient
and/or an overly expensive audit (Shaub and Lawrence, 2002; Nelson, 2009).
Under a presumptive doubt approach, auditors are expected to be more skeptical of
evidence that an assertion is true (Nelson, 2009). Bell, Peecher and Thomas (2005) points out
that this approach is likely to raise the minimum levels of evidence required to support an
unqualified opinion. Nelson (2009, p. 4) further acknowledges that “under this definition, high
professional skepticism may not result in an audit that has an optimal balance of effectiveness
and efficiency.” Consequently, requiring auditors to adopt a presumptive doubt perspective could
lead to inefficiencies if they are overly skeptical of evidence that an error does not exist,
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particularly if the evidence is of sufficient strength to afford confidence that an error does not
exist.

Avenues for Future Research

As noted previously, prior research has documented the susceptibility of auditors to
confirmation bias when evaluating audit evidence, due to the tendency to favor an initial
hypothesis frame (e.g., Waller and Felix, 1984; Church, 1990; Smith and Kida, 1991; Bamber,
Ramsay and Tubbs, 1997; Beeler and Hunton, 2002). Adopting a presumptive doubt perspective
of skepticism has been suggested as a possible solution to this problem, by asking auditors to
presume doubt as their initial hypothesis frame. However, to date, no research has examined the
implications of asking auditors to adopt a presumptive doubt over a neutral perspective. Thus,
the following research question is proposed:

RQ1: Does asking auditors to adopt a presumptive doubt perspective, over a neutral
perspective, of professional skepticism reduce their susceptibility to bias?

In order to achieve an optimal balance between audit efficiency and effectiveness, the
auditor must exercise skepticism until sufficient, persuasive evidence is acquired to support audit
assertions. Spires (1991) identifies verifiability as an underlying construct of audit evidence
which contributes to its strength or persuasiveness. Similarly, Mautz and Sharaf (1961) maintain
that “verification is the vehicle that carries one to a position of confidence about any given
proposition.”
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Verifiability has been defined in the literature as the “attribute of information which
allows qualified individuals working independently of one another to develop essentially similar
measures or conclusions from an examination of the same evidence, data or records (Power,
1996, p. 289).” Furthermore, Hirst (1994) notes that evidence verifiability decreases with the
degree to which reported evidence is subjective and judgmental and increases with the degree of
objectivity. Evidence which has readily available supporting documentation is likely to produce
the same decision outcome upon review by multiple parties. Hirst (1994) argues that because
such evidence can be confirmed with relative ease, it is also more likely to be honestly reported.
Evidence which involves significant judgment however, presents a greater potential for bias or
misrepresentation (Peters, Lewis and Dhar, 1989). A failure to exercise an appropriate level of
professional skepticism when evidence lacks sufficient strength to rule out misstatement
represents a potential threat to audit effectiveness. Consequently, skepticism should increase as
evidence becomes more difficult to verify.
On the other hand, Mautz and Sharaf (1961, p 97) maintain that a skeptical auditor
“should be hard to convince, but not impossible.” While a more aggressive position towards
skepticism might improve effectiveness in detecting misstatements or fraud, too much skepticism
can be inefficient, costly, and potentially damaging to the auditor-client relationship (APB,
2010). Auditing standards require sufficient, competent evidence to support audit assertions.
Once such evidence has been collected, continued skepticism would be inefficient. For example,
Shaub and Lawrence (2002) describe an overly “aggressive skeptic” as being constantly
suspicious, even when evidence indicates a low-risk of material misstatement.
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Figure 1 depicts the potential imbalance of efficiency and effectiveness based on the
perspective of skepticism and the verifiability of evidence. Depending on the perspective
adopted, the degree of skepticism varies as evidence becomes more verifiable. At low levels of
verifiability, audit effectiveness may be threatened by a tendency for auditor’s to exhibit
confirmation bias (e.g., an overreliance on the representations of management). Alternatively,
audit efficiency may be threatened if auditors exhibit an elevated degree of skepticism despite
strong evidence. Consequently, requiring auditors to adopt a presumptive doubt perspective
could lead to inefficiencies if they are overly skeptical of evidence that an error does not exist,
particularly if the evidence is of sufficient strength to afford confidence that an error does not
exist. Thus, the following research question is proposed:

RQ2: Does adopting a presumptive doubt approach of professional skepticism lead
to unnecessary evidence collection?

Discussion and Conclusion

Disagreement regarding how to define professional skepticism raises several concerns for
the auditing profession. First, standard setters need to determine exactly how they expect
auditors to exercise skepticism in practice. If those expectations differ depending on the evidence
being evaluated or the level of fraud risk involved, auditing standards should clearly and
consistently explain these differences. Second, audit firms need to be informed about the
expectations surrounding professional skepticism so that they may conduct audits that are
consistent with regulatory expectations and develop training programs to foster and develop
13

skeptical behavior. Finally, adopting a neutral or a presumptive doubt perspective of professional
skepticism can have serious implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of the audit
engagement.
Prior research has demonstrated that auditors tend to be susceptible to confirmation bias
in favor of their initial hypothesis. While the neutral perspective asks auditors to cast aside any
beliefs regarding the honesty of management (SAS No. 1), they may inadvertently be more
susceptible to bias in favor of a perceived reliable client. Consequently, neutral auditors may be
more likely to rely on management representations rather than collecting sufficient, competent
evidence to support assertions. A presumptive doubt auditor however, may be more skeptical to a
fault. Presuming doubt may reduce susceptibility to client-favoring bias, yet result in the
performance of unnecessary audit procedures. Therefore, future research is needed to determine
the implications of adopting one perspective over the other.
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PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM IN PRACTICE: INCENTIVES TO
BEHAVE LESS SKEPTICALLY
Introduction

In a recent review of the auditing literature regarding professional skepticism, Nelson
(2009) presents a model of skepticism (hereafter, the “Nelson Model”) whereby auditors’
skeptical judgments are a function of 1) evidential input, consisting of as little as background
information about the client or as much as all evidence collected during the audit; 2) incentives
to increase or reduce skepticism; 3) traits, including problem-solving ability, moral reasoning
and trait skepticism, 4) knowledge and 5) experience. Whether skeptical action, such as
modification of audit procedures, transpires as a result of skeptical judgments depends on both
the level of skepticism an auditor exhibits in his or her judgments and the last 4 of the 5
determinants listed above. Nelson (2009, p 4) defines professional skepticism as follows:
“A skeptic is one whose behavior indicates relatively more doubt about the validity of some
assertion. More specifically, I define [skepticism] as indicated by auditor judgments and
decisions that reflect a heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is incorrect,
conditional on the information available to the auditor. Under this definition, an auditor who
has high [skepticism] needs relatively more convincing (in the form of a more persuasive set of
evidence) before concluding that an assertion is correct.”
In an initial test of the Nelson Model, Carpenter and Reimers (2009) find that when
presented with either evidence indicating fraud or incentives emphasizing skepticism auditors
made more skeptical judgments, but only when both conditions were present did they modify
audit procedures. Although these results provide support for the Nelson Model by identifying
elements which positively impact professional skepticism, attempts to improve skeptical
behavior could be thwarted or offset by incentives to compromise objectivity. Nelson (2009, p
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11), notes that “offsetting incentives to reduce professional skepticism also exist.” Furthermore,
prior research suggests that auditors may be inherently more or less skeptical by nature, defining
skepticism as a “multi-dimensional individual characteristic (Hurtt, 2010, p 150).” Thus,
research is needed to examine incentives which might threaten or reduce skeptical judgment.
Examination is also needed to determine whether individuals with varying levels of inherent, or
trait skepticism are more or less susceptible to such incentives.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First, incentives which may threaten
an auditor’s ability to behave skeptically are considered. Next, research pertaining to trait
professional skepticism is discussed. Finally, potential avenues for future research are suggested
and concluding remarks are presented.

Threats to Professional Skepticism

While practitioners contend that a well-designed audit protects them from bias (Rennie,
Kopp and Lemon, 2010), critics have argued that auditors are unconsciously less skeptical of
clients with whom they have developed close working relationships or financial dependencies
(Bazerman, Morgan and Lowenstein, 1997). Accordingly, auditing standards pertaining to
professional skepticism and fraud (e.g., SAS No. 1 and No. 99) clearly state that auditors should
disregard attitudinal factors that suggest low risk (e.g., honesty and integrity) when determining
the sufficiency of audit evidence and the risk of misstatement due to fraud. However, Attribution
Theory (Heider, 1944; Kelley and Michela, 1980) suggests that setting aside such beliefs may be
difficult due to the tendency for dispositional characteristics to be heavily weighted when
considering the likelihood that an individual will engage in a particular behavior (Ybarra and
16

Stephan, 1999). In other words, when assessing the likelihood that management will engage in
fraudulent financial reporting, auditors may have trouble disregarding a perception that
management possesses low-risk attitudes towards fraud. Furthermore, a high ratio of audit fees to
firm revenue, for a particular audit client, also represents an incentive for auditors to behave less
skeptically due to fiscal reliance on certain key clients (DeAngelo, 1981).

Attribution of Management Attitudes
The basic tenets of Attribution Theory (Heider, 1944; Kelley, 1973) hold that when
attempting to explain another person’s behavior, individuals either attribute cause to the person
(internal, or dispositional characteristics) or to the situation (external, or environmental
characteristics). This distinction is regarded as a product of certain antecedents to attribution,
whereby information about the behavior, beliefs about the actor or the situation, and motivation
influence an individual’s inference of cause (Kelley and Michela, 1980). Furthermore, whether
the perceived cause of a particular behavior is attributed to the actor or the situation also has
consequences for how the actor is perceived going forward. If a behavior is attributed to the
actor’s dispositional characteristics it may also affect such things as likability, trustworthiness or
persuasiveness (Kelley and Michela, 1980).
Attributions for past behaviors have also been found to drive expectations of future
behavior (Reeder, Henderson and Sullivan, 1982; Ybarra and Stephan, 1999). Accordingly,
dispositional attributions, such as assessments of character, are often perceived to have
behavioral manifestations – a phenomenon generally known as trait attribution (Ross and
Nisbett, 2010). While trait attribution is largely regarded by social psychology as inaccurate in
predicting actual behavior, the reality remains that dispositional characteristics are commonly
17

referred to when developing expectations of how another person will behave (Ross and Nisbett,
2010). For example, a person believed to be of good character would be expected to behave
ethically, despite situational pressures to behave otherwise, while moral behavior would rarely be
expected from a person of bad character (Ross and Nisbett, 2010)1.

Client Importance and Dependence
Consistent with the economic theory of dependence (DeAngelo, 1981), when audit and
non-audit fees from a single audit engagement are considerable, relative to overall firm revenue,
a significant incentive exists for auditors to compromise their independence. With the ability to
terminate the relationship at any time, clients are in a unique position to affect auditor judgment.
Consequently, auditors may be motivated to report favorably in order to ensure retention of a
valuable client. While, at the firm level, large numbers of audit clients may offset incentives to
cheat, when individual partners, offices or other firm units derive substantial revenues from a
single client, the implications to independence are considerable (Wallman, 1996; Reynolds and
Francis, 2001).
Extensive research has examined the relationship between economic dependence and
various measures of independence with mixed results. Archival research considering reporting
outcomes and accrual activity has generally concluded that client importance and fee dependence
do not jeopardize independence. For example, Reynolds and Francis (2001) find that auditors do

1

Ybarra and Stephan (1999) note that an additional distinction in the attribution literature relates to the attributions
that result from either positive or negative behaviors. Results of multiple experiments indicate that when individuals
perceive another person to be motivated by dispositional factors (e.g. wants or needs), they will be more likely to
expect the actor to engage in negative behavior than when the actor is motivated by situational factors. However, the
focus of this study is the distinction between positive and negative dispositional factors (e.g. honesty vs. dishonesty)
rather than positive and negative behavior.
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not treat larger clients with favoritism with respect to accruals or going concern reports.
Similarly, studies investigating an auditor’s propensity to issue a qualified opinion have
concluded that higher levels of fee dependence are not associated with a decreased likelihood of
qualification (Craswell et al., 2002; Li, 2009) or with abnormal accruals (Chung and Kallapur,
2003).
On the other hand, experimental research reveals that economic dependence on important
audit clients significantly influences auditor judgment as well as perceptions of independence.
Trompeter (1994) addresses the issue of fee dependence by examining the effects of
compensation schemes which emphasize profitability and client retention. Findings indicate that
audit partners whose compensation is closely tied to client retention are more likely to be
influenced by client preferences and less likely to require adjustments which lower income. This
relationship was particularly strong when partners were from firms with small profit pools. One
explanation for auditor bias in favor of important clients is offered by Beeler and Hunton (2002)
who posit that contingent economic rents can lead to bias via the cognitive process of
predecisonal distortion of information. They find that when auditors develop an initial preference
for client retention in order to secure future earnings, they exhibit a tendency to evaluate
evidence in a distorted way. This distortion was found to affect auditor judgments regarding
going concern and budget hour revisions in a manner favoring the client.
Other academic research has shown that the size of audit fees pertaining to a single client
also affects third-party perceptions of auditors’ ability to resist management pressure (Gul, 1991)
and are perceived by investors as a threat to auditor independence (Khurana and Raman, 2006).
Accordingly, Nelson (2009) suggests that pressure to keep audit fees low or to maintain office
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profitability creates incentives which offset the likelihood that an auditor will behave skeptically.
Previous research has not yet examined the effects of client importance on skeptical behavior.

Trait Professional Skepticism

Professional skepticism has been defined in the literature from several different
perspectives. While “neutral” versus “presumptive doubt” refer to alternative degrees of
skepticism with which the auditor initially approaches an engagement, Hurtt (2010, p 150) notes
that “professional skepticism is a multi-dimensional individual characteristic … [and] can be
both a trait (a relatively stable, enduring aspect of an individual) and also a state (a temporary
condition aroused by situational variables.” Moreover, Hurtt (2010) develops a scale (hereafter
referred to as the “Hurtt Scale”) which measures an individual’s inherent skepticism based on six
characteristics – suspension of judgment, questioning mind, search for knowledge, interpersonal
understanding, autonomy, and self-esteem.
The first three characteristics of the Hurtt Scale pertain to the process of evidence
evaluation. For example, a questioning mind refers to the extent to which the auditor seeks
clarification or corroboration of audit evidence. Next, suspension of judgment refers to the
tendency to withhold judgment until evidence has been sufficiently clarified or corroborated.
Consistent with the requirement for due professional care (SAS No. 1), a skeptical auditor is
expected to continue to gather and objectively evaluate audit evidence until it is considered to be
sufficiently persuasive to afford judgment. However, a skeptical auditor does not just question
audit evidence because of doubt, but for the sake of knowing and understanding. Thus, a search
for knowledge refers to a general attitude of curiosity. Complementary to the first three
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characteristics, interpersonal understanding relates to evaluating the source of evidence – their
motivation, honesty and integrity. Finally, the characteristics of autonomy and self-esteem deal
with the ability of the auditor to respond appropriately to collected evidence. For example,
recognizing that audit evidence indicates a higher risk of fraud is not effective if the auditor does
not appropriately modify planned audit procedures to address the increased risk.

Avenues for Future Research

When assessing the risk of fraudulent financial reporting, Statement on Auditing
Standards (SAS) No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit (AICPA, 2002)
requires auditors to consider the presence of risk factors pertaining to the three components of
the fraud triangle – including, “incentives/pressures to perpetrate fraud, opportunities to carry out
the fraud and attitudes/rationalizations to justify a fraudulent action (AU 316.31).” While risks
related to pressures and opportunities can for the most part be objectively assessed, “observing
that individuals have the requisite attitude to commit fraud … is difficult at best (AU 316.35).”
This is primarily due to the possibility that management will attempt to cover up a fraudulent
scheme by misrepresenting themselves to the auditors. Consequently, SAS No. 99 argues that
attitude factors alone do not constitute sufficient evidence to conclude that fraud is unlikely and
recommends that auditors disregard dispositional characteristics which suggest a low risk of
fraud (e.g. honesty, integrity, etc.). The concern is that when management is perceived as having
a low-risk attitude towards fraud, auditors’ will be less skeptical of the possibility that the
financial statements are misstated due to fraud. Wilks and Zimbelman (2004, p 723) warn that
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when presented with low-risk attitude cues auditors “may overlook high levels of opportunity
and incentive cues that suggest fraud.”
The tendency of individuals to make less extreme (i.e. less skeptical) decisions in the
presence of irrelevant information is referred to as the dilution effect (Nisbett et al., 1981). In
other words, a dilution effect exists if irrelevant information reduces an auditor’s sensitivity to
other relevant factors in the audit environment. Although research on the dilution effect in an
accounting setting is limited, Hackenbrack (1992) and Hoffman and Patton (1997) find evidence
that auditors’ fraud risk assessments are lower (i.e. diluted) when other factors in the audit
environment, which should be irrelevant to the assessment, indicate low-risk. With regards to
fraud risk, auditors are directed to consider low-risk management attitudes towards fraud to be
irrelevant information which can threaten their ability to behave skeptically and result in diluted
fraud risk assessments. Thus, the following research question is proposed:

RQ1: Are auditors’ fraud risk assessments diluted when the client displays
characteristics consistent with low fraud risk (e.g. honesty and integrity)?

Consistent with the postulates of economic dependence, it is expected that, when a client
is especially important to the profitability of the audit firm and local office, auditors may make
decisions which favor client retention over skepticism. Consequently, auditors may exhibit
decreased sensitivity to high risk factors (e.g. pressures and opportunities), resulting in diluted
fraud risk assessments. Furthermore, because both low-risk management attitudes and high client
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importance are expected to result in auditor bias, the dilution effect may be stronger when both
conditions are present. Thus the following research questions are proposed:

RQ2: Are auditors’ fraud risk assessments diluted when the client is of high
importance to the profitability of their local office?
RQ3: Are the dilutive effects of low-risk management attitudes and client
importance additive?

Hurtt, Eining and Plumlee (2008) find that auditors scoring higher on the professional
skepticism scale behave differently than those who score low on the scale. More specifically,
they find that more inherently skeptical auditors tend to engage in more skeptical behavior when
it comes to the assessment of audit evidence and generation of alternative explanations.
However, research has not yet examined whether susceptibility to bias fluctuates with levels of
trait skepticism. Thus, the following research question is proposed:

RQ4: Are auditors less sensitive to low-risk management attitudes and high client
importance when trait skepticism is high?

Discussion and Conclusion
This paper postulates whether factors pertaining to personal (e.g. management attitudes
towards fraud) and economic (e.g. client importance) aspects of the auditor-client relationship
may be detrimental to an auditor’s ability to exercise professional skepticism. Furthermore, the
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role of trait professional skepticism in potentially mitigating auditor susceptibility to bias is
discussed. While auditing standards address the need to disregard such information as irrelevant
to fraud-related judgments, the basic postulates of attribution theory and the theory of economic
dependence indicate that auditors may be more susceptible to bias when their clients exhibit lowrisk attitudes towards fraud or when they are particularly important to the profitability of the
auditor’s local office.
Furthermore, prior research suggests that auditor’s fraud risk assessments are susceptible
to dilution (Nisbett et al., 1981; Hackenbrack, 1992; Hoffman and Patton, 1997) such that they
are less sensitive to the existence of high risk factors pertaining to opportunity and pressure to
commit fraud. The possibility that this bias may be unintentional (Bazerman, Morgan and
Lowenstein, 1997) is particularly concerning because practitioners have generally argued that a
well-designed audit protects them from susceptibility to such biases (Rennie, Kopp and Lemon,
2010). But, a decreased sensitivity to other factors, suggesting an elevated risk of fraudulent
activity, is consistent with regulator’s concerns that a rigorous audit cannot prevent audit failure
if sufficient skepticism is not exercised (SEC, 2009). Therefore, further research is needed to
understand how auditor’s skeptical behavior can be negatively affected by their relationship with
the client.
Such information could be useful in developing specific strategies to prevent diluted
fraud risk assessments related to impaired skepticism. For example, an independent assessment
of fraud risk, by an auditor who is not a primary member of the engagement team, may be
beneficial. Furthermore, emphasis on the consequences related to unconscious biases may be
needed in both the classroom and mandatory firm training.
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Research is also needed to determine whether auditors who are inherently more skeptical
than others are less susceptible to bias. Such findings could have important implications for
hiring and promotion decisions within audit firms. Future research could also examine whether
trait skepticism can be taught or improved over time with education or training.

25

FAIRNESS, ACCOUNTABILITY AND THE DETERMINATION OF
AUDIT FAILURE DUE TO A LACK OF PROFESSIONAL SKEPTICISM
Introduction

Auditing standards require auditors to maintain a skeptical mindset when planning and
performing the audit (SAS No. 109), reviewing confirmations (SAS No. 67), evaluating
management estimates (SAS No. 57), and considering the risk of fraudulent financial reporting
(SAS No. 99). Yet analysis of enforcement actions reveals that auditors are frequently
challenged by regulators for failing to exercise a sufficient level of skepticism during the audit
(Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson, 2001; SEC, 2003; Messier, Kozloski and KochetovaKozloski, 2010). In fact, individuals from both the SEC and the PCAOB have recently expressed
concern that a failure to exercise an appropriate level of professional skepticism may be a
leading cause of audit failure (PCAOB, 2008; Nelson, 2009; SEC, 2009).
Not surprisingly, practitioners and regulators appear to strongly disagree on the issue. In
2010, the Auditing Practices Board (APB) solicited responses from practitioners regarding the
nature of professional skepticism and how it is developed and promoted within the profession
(APB, 2010). In particular, the discussion paper asked firms to comment on whether the recent
regulatory action for insufficient skepticism is warranted. Much of the feedback reflected the
opinion that auditors are in fact, sufficiently skeptical and question the basis on which regulators
determine whether sufficient skepticism has been exercised (APB, 2011). Therefore, an
important question is raised regarding how regulators determine whether an auditor should be
held accountable for insufficient skepticism. A better understanding of how regulators evaluate
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skepticism could provide auditors with the necessary insight to more visibly demonstrate
skeptical behavior.
The purpose of this study is to examine instances of audit failure, as reported by the SEC
in Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Actions (AAERs)2, and the conditions under which a
lack of skepticism allegedly contributed to that failure. More specifically, this study adopts a
fairness-based conceptual framework which predicts that regulators will consider factors
pertaining to (1) extent of injury, (2) the auditor-client relationship and (3) adherence to
applicable standards, when determining whether to hold auditors accountable for a lack of
skepticism. While prior research has examined factors associated with the likelihood of
enforcement actions against the auditor (Feroz, Park and Pastina., 1991; Campbell and Parker,
1992), research has not yet examined factors which may be perceived by regulators as indicative
of insufficient skepticism.
Findings suggest that the SEC determines whether sufficient skepticism has been
exercised by evaluating whether the auditor should have been more skeptical, based on guidance
provided by relevant auditing standards. With the benefit of hindsight, the SEC can assess
whether the auditor was aware of specific risk factors or an elevated level of risk during a
particular audit engagement, both of which require a heightened level of professional skepticism
(SAS No. 99). SAS No. 99 also cautions auditors of the need for skepticism towards
management as a source of audit evidence, and thorough fraud investigations allow for
identification of instances where the client either lied to or provided the auditor with false or

2

I thank Mark Beasley, Joseph Carcello, Dana Hermanson and Terry Neal for generously sharing their list of fraudrelated AAERs between 1998 and 2007 examined by Beasley et al. (2010) analysis of fraudulent financial reporting,
sponsored by the Treadway Commission.
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misleading information. Results of this study indicate that when the SEC perceives that the
auditor was aware of an elevated risk of fraud or when the client has been accused of lying to the
auditor, they are more likely to cite a lack of professional skepticism as a reason for the audit
failure.
This study makes several contributions to the academic literature and audit practice. It is
the first to address the issue of auditor accountability for an alleged lack of professional
skepticism. A lack of precision in defining professional skepticism in both the literature and
audit standards (Nelson, 2009), allows for considerable variation in what is perceived to
constitute skeptical behavior. A better understanding of the basis by which regulators are
questioning skepticism could allow auditors to develop strategies to more visibly demonstrate
skeptical behavior, thereby reducing the likelihood of unwarranted enforcement action. For
example, auditors need to be aware that the way in which they assess and respond to risks related
to fraud sends an important message to regulators regarding the level of skepticism being
exercised. Professional skepticism should be increased as the risk of fraud increases.
Furthermore, auditors should reevaluate how to handle information provided be client
management, particularly as a source of audit evidence. Based on this study’s findings, if the
client is later determined to have been dishonest, the auditor’s skeptical behavior may be called
into question.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The following section summarizes
findings from past examinations of audit enforcement actions followed by development of
hypotheses within a fairness theory framework. Next, the methodology, research model and
findings are discussed. The final section summarizes and concludes.
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Background

AAERs are enforcement actions issued by the SEC against public companies found guilty
of an accounting violation, often related to fraudulent financial reporting. Common fraud-related
violations by companies include intentional falsification or misstatement of financial statements,
overstatement of assets or income and inadequacy or omission of required disclosures. In some
instances only the registrant is named in the AAER, while in others both the auditor and the
company are named (Rollins and Bremser, 1997).
In a recent COSO-sponsored study on fraudulent financial reporting in the U.S.3, Beasley
et al. (2010) find that of alleged frauds identified by the SEC between 1998 and 2007, 23 percent
cited the external auditor for alleged involvement in the fraud. However, 99 percent of opinions
issued on the last set of fraudulently issued financials were unqualified and only 56 percent
contained explanatory language. Although simply issuing an unqualified opinion does not
constitute reason to initiate action against the auditor, the significant gap between enforcement
actions against auditors and unsuccessful detections of fraud raises an important question
regarding how the SEC determines whether an audit failure has occurred.
Relevant prior research has reviewed AAERs for evidence of factors which might affect
the likelihood of enforcement actions against the auditor. In an analysis of AAERs between 1982
and 1989, auditors were most often cited for a lack of sufficient competent evidence, not
performing required audit procedures or failing to corroborate management assertions (Feroz,
3

The purpose of the study, Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, was “to provide a comprehensive analysis
of fraudulent financial reporting occurrences investigated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (Beasley et
al., 2010).” The basis for this analysis was a review of 1,335 AAERs issued by the SEC between January 1998 and
December 2007 which identified 347 companies involved in alleged instance of fraudulent financial reporting.
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Park and Pastina, 1991). Further, the SEC most often attributed audit failures to insufficient
evidence collection and over-reliance on the representations of management (Campbell and
Parker, 1992). As these factors are generally considered representative of un-skeptical behavior
(Peecher, 1996; Turner, 2001), professional skepticism has unsurprisingly been regarded as a
problem area by regulators.
For example, former SEC Chief Accountant George Diacont recognized a lack of
skepticism as a major contributor to audit failure (Carmichael and Craig, 1996; Nelson, 2009).
Associate Chief Accountant of the SEC Jason Flemmons also commented that “a common thread
in many … enforcement actions against outside auditors is the failure to demonstrate
professional skepticism by obtaining persuasive audit evidence” (SEC, 2009, p 6). These views
have been echoed by the PCAOB who, after reviewing inspections between 2004 and 2007,
noted that “in some cases, the deficiencies appeared to have been caused, at least in part, by the
failure to apply an appropriate level of professional skepticism when conducting audit
procedures and evaluating audit results” (PCAOB, 2008, p 2). Evidence of regulator concerns is
provided by Beasley, Carcello and Hermanson (2001), who find that 60 percent of SEC
enforcement actions against auditors between 1987 and 1997 referenced the auditor’s failure to
maintain an attitude of professional skepticism. Extending the analysis, the SEC identified an
additional 53% between 1997 and 2002 (SEC, 2003)4.
While there appears to be a clear link between audit enforcement actions and a lack of
professional skepticism, the process by which skeptical behavior is evaluated is extremely
4

In accordance with Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), the SEC conducted an examination of
enforcement actions over the five years preceding the enactment of SOX in order to identify areas susceptible to
fraud, manipulation or earnings management. All enforcement actions filed during the period between July 31, 1997
and July 30, 2002 were reviewed and findings were reported to Congress.
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ambiguous. Due to the high incidence of skepticism-related citations (Beasley, Carcello and
Hermanson, 2001; SEC, 2003), auditors ought to be concerned with factors perceived to be
indicative of insufficient skepticism. In other words, under what circumstances will the SEC
consider the auditor “blameworthy” for failing to maintain a skeptical mindset?

Theory and Hypothesis Development

Fairness Theory
Fundamental to the process of assigning blame in social justice is the issue of
accountability (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001). In a model of justice and accountability, entitled
“Fairness Theory”, Folger and Cropanzano (2001) contend that the decision regarding whether to
hold a party accountable for the outcome of a specified event is a function of the perceived
fairness of their actions5. In order to determine perceived fairness, three components of
accountability must be considered. First, an event occurs which has negative implications for the
well-being of others. In this case, an alleged fraud has occurred which the auditor has failed to
detect. Depending on the nature and magnitude of the fraud, investors, creditors and other
affected parties may suffer moderate to severe consequences. Regardless, regulators must
determine whether or not the auditor bears some responsibility for the outcome. For example, did
the auditor exercise an appropriate level of skepticism throughout the audit?
Second, there is an element of perceived volitional control over the chosen course of
action. This component refers to the availability of feasible alternatives – with more available

5

Closely related to Fairness Theory are Referent Cognitions Theory (Folger, 1987) and Equity Theory (Adams,
1965). While both of these theories discuss the determination and consequences of injustice, neither explicitly
emphasize how accountability decisions are made.
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alternatives being associated with greater control and a higher likelihood of blame. Similarly, an
auditor believed to have the option of behaving more skeptically in a given situation is more
likely to be blamed for failing to detect fraud.
Third, actions taken are considered relative to moral tenets or applicable standards. For
example, regulators must determine whether audit actions were consistent with guidance outlined
in auditing standards regarding professional skepticism and fraud (e.g. SAS No. 1 and SAS No.
99). Thus, the three basic elements of fairness theory include (a) a harmful event, that is (b)
attributable to an individual’s discretionary actions which (c) violate applicable ethical standards
(Folger and Cropanzano, 2001).
Although fairness theory primarily aims to explain how individuals assign blame to other
individuals, it is also useful for understanding the determinations of accountability at a firm
level. Koonce and Mercer (2005, p 4) argue that application of psychology theory to
examinations of archival information allows for an opportunity to gain a better understanding of
the “causal mechanisms or processes underlying behavior.” In applying fairness theory to the
SEC’s evaluation of auditor behavior, information documented in enforcement actions is
considered representative of the collective decision making of individuals at the SEC regarding
the individual and collective behavior of auditors and the firms who employ them6.
Counterfactual Reasoning
Also essential to fairness theory is the process of counterfactual reasoning – a method
used to attribute meaning to negative experiences. In simple terms, individuals ask themselves

6

For any given case of alleged fraud, enforcement actions can be filed against one or more individuals at the
company, the company itself, one or more members of the audit engagement team and/or the audit firm responsible
for the engagement.
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how the experience might have been different if things had unfolded differently (Roese and
Olson, 1995). By engaging in counterfactual thinking, individuals determine how they feel about
a negative experience by considering the actual outcome relative to hypothetical alternatives. For
example, a negative experience might not seem so bad when compared to an alternative that
would have been a lot worse. But if the same experience could have easily been avoided
altogether, it may seem far worse than if there had been no viable alternatives.
Folger and Cropanzano (2001) argue that counterfactual thinking is useful in determining
whether an individual should be held accountable for the consequences of their actions. By
contrasting an actual outcome with what would, could or should have happened had alternative
actions been taken, the perceived fairness of a harmful event can be assessed. Effectively, less
perceived fairness is associated with a greater likelihood of accountability. In applying fairness
theory to evaluating accountability for the degree of skepticism exercised during an audit,
counterfactual reasoning can be represented by questions of “Would, Could and Should?”7 A
diagram of the three relevant judgments is presented in Figure 2.
First, an aversive state is compared to alternative, more beneficial states in order to
determine extent of injury – Would the outcome have been different had the auditor been more
skeptical? Second, the individual’s conduct is considered relative to available alternatives –
Could the auditor have behaved more skeptically? Finally, the behavior is considered relative to
applicable standards or moral tenets – Should the auditor have behaved more skeptically? The

7

While the three judgments of fairness theory are described in order of injury, conduct and standards, this is by no
means meant to suggest that they must occur consecutively. Rather, such judgments are interrelated and may even
occur simultaneously (Folger and Cropanzano, 2001).
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following subsections discuss the three judgments regarding injury, conduct and standards, in
more detail.

Injury: Magnitude and Type of Fraud
Fairness theory predicts that the magnitude of perceived injury is associated with
accountability judgments such that the greater the perceived injury, the greater the likelihood that
an individual will be held accountable for the event causing the injury. This represents a “would”
counterfactual, where the question is “would things have been different had the harmful event
not occurred?” Folger and Cropanzano (2001) argue that in order to gauge injury, the outcome
of a harmful event (e.g., fraud) must be compared to a referent standard (e.g., no fraud).
Generally speaking, individuals are more likely to be held accountable for an event as the
discrepancy between the outcome of the actual event and the referent standard increases. This is
because, as the magnitude of injury increases, it becomes clearer that things would have been
very different had the event not occurred. In this case, the greater the magnitude of the fraudulent
scheme the greater the extent of injury to users of the financial statements.
If the outcomes of previous frauds are any indication of the expectations for skeptical
behavior, then high-profile cases such as Enron and WorldCom suggest that frauds of extreme
magnitudes should also be accompanied by elevated skepticism. In both cases, auditors were
held accountable for a failure to exercise due professional care and necessary skepticism to
ensure financial statements were presented in conformity with GAAP. Accordingly, the
magnitude of the fraud is expected to be considered by individuals at the SEC when determining
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whether to hold individual auditors or an audit firm accountable for insufficient skeptical
behavior. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H1:

There is a positive association between the magnitude of the fraud and the
likelihood that the SEC will hold the auditor accountable for a lack of
professional skepticism.

While referent standards are useful in assessing the relative damage of a harmful event,
Folger and Cropanzano (2001, p 8) note that “the decision-making process is also evaluated
relative to referent standards for such processes.” Defining a referent standard in this case,
involves determining the circumstances under which a sufficiently skeptical auditor would be
expected to detect fraud. In other words, would the fraud have been detected had the auditor
decidedly been more skeptical? To address this question, counterfactual reasoning is applied to
contrast the chosen course of action in an injurious event with a referent standard of well-being.
In this case, the chosen course of action is the level of skepticism that the auditor has chosen to
exercise and the injurious event is fraud. Thus, an appropriate referent standard would be a case
where the fraud was successfully detected.
For example, imagine that two individual auditors – Auditor A and Auditor B – are
assigned to separate audit engagements of companies who have each been accused of fraudulent
financial reporting. Assume that both auditors failed to detect the fraudulent scheme and that
both exercised the same level of skepticism. Also assume however, that the fraud encountered by
Auditor A was considered to have a far greater likelihood of detection than the fraud encountered
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by Auditor B. Counterfactual reasoning suggests that Auditor A would be more likely to be held
accountable for a lack of professional skepticism than Auditor B because it would be easier to
imagine circumstances under which sufficient skepticism would have led to successful fraud
detection. Thus, an auditor is more likely to be held accountable for actions taken during the
audit (e.g. demonstration of skepticism) when it is easier to imagine how things would things
have been different (e.g. detection of fraud) had the auditor chosen an alternative course of
action.
Financial statement fraud may be perpetrated using a variety of different schemes – some
of which include falsifying of records, intentionally misstating information, omitting required
disclosures or misapplying existing accounting standards (Rezaee, 2005). However, certain
accounts have been linked with a higher incidence of fraud (Hammersley, 2011). For example,
improper or premature revenue recognition and recording fictitious revenue have been regarded
as the most common fraudulent schemes (SEC, 2003; Beasley et al., 2010; Hammersely, 2011).
From a fairness theory perspective, it would be easier to imagine that a sufficiently skeptical
auditor would be successful in detecting commonly occurring frauds. Consistent with this notion,
Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998) find that auditors are more likely to be held responsible for
failing to detect frauds which are commonly occurring (e.g., fictitious revenues and premature
revenue recognition). Accordingly, if an auditor fails to detect a common fraudulent scheme,
they may be perceived by individuals at the SEC as lacking an appropriate level of skepticism.
Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
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H2:

There is a positive association between commonly occurring frauds and the
likelihood that the SEC will hold the auditor accountable for a lack of
professional skepticism.

Conduct: Auditor Tenure
While a “would” counterfactual establishes the aversiveness of a harmful event, a
“could” counterfactual involves comparing the behavior in question (i.e. professional skepticism
exercised) with alternatives available to the individual at the time (i.e., exercise more
skepticism). Folger and Cropanzano (2001, p 11) argue that “when people answer the ‘could’
question they are trying to determine whether an alternative action was a feasible, viable option
for the target person.” Fairness theory postulates that when an individual has multiple options for
how to behave in a given situation, they are considered to have greater discretionary or volitional
control over their actions. Consequently, they are more likely to be held accountable for their
chosen course of action because they could have behaved differently. On the other hand, when
an individual is perceived to have chosen the only course of action available to them, they are
less likely to be blamed for aversive outcomes.
While the auditor presumably has complete discretionary control over the degree of
skepticism exercised, determining whether they could have behaved more skeptically is made
complicated because alternatives exist on a highly subjective continuum. Rather than comparing
actions to mutually exclusive alternatives, as suggested by Folger and Cropanzano (2001),
skeptical behavior must be compared to alternative degrees of skepticism. An argument could
therefore be made that an auditor could always be more skeptical. Consequently, it is more
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practical to consider factors which would prevent the auditor from taking an alternative, more
skeptical, course of action. In other words, is there any reason to believe that skepticism may
have been impaired?
Prior research has acknowledged that certain factors in the audit environment represent
incentives which can offset professional skepticism (Nelson, 2009). Essentially, the argument is
that auditors are susceptible to self-serving bias – where audit judgments unintentionally favor
the client’s interests – because of an inclination to preserve the auditor-client relationship or
retain economic rents in the long-term (Bazerman, Morgan and Lowenstein, 1997). Within a
fairness theory framework, the auditor would be more likely to be held accountable for a lack of
professional skepticism if objectivity is believed to have been impaired. For example, the length
of the auditor-client relationship has been argued to impair objectivity and independence
(Bamber and Iyer, 2007; Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002).
Prior research examining the relationship between auditor tenure and audit quality has
generated mixed results. Focusing on various measures of audit quality, including discretionary
accruals, fraudulent financial reporting, earnings management and earnings quality, some studies
have found that longer auditor tenure impairs audit quality (Dopuch, King and Shwartz, 2001;
Commission on Public Trust and Private Enterprise, 2003; Casterella, Knechel and Walker,
2004; Myers et al., 2004; Carey and Simnett, 2006). Others have suggested that audit quality
actually improves with the length of the auditor-client relationship or is unrelated to tenure
(Geiger and Raghunadan, 2002; Johnson, Khurana and Reynolds, 2002; Myers et al., 2003;
Carcello and Nagy, 2004; Ghosh and Moon, 2005; Knechel and Vanstraelen, 2007; Chen, Lin
and Lin, 2008).
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While the majority of studies regarding auditor tenure have discussed auditors’ economic
incentives to compromise audit quality in the long-term, Bamber and Iyer (2007) point out that
threats posed by social incentives are of equal concern. Specifically, they find that the number of
years an individual auditor serves on an engagement is directly related to the extent to which
they identify with the client. Moreover, client identification was found to impair objectivity –
that is, auditors who identified with their clients were more likely to acquiesce to the client’s
preferred accounting treatment. Similarly, Rennie, Kopp and Lemon (2010) find a positive
relationship between the length of the auditor-client relationship and trust, which has been
regarded as the complement (or opposite) of suspicion (Shaub, 1996).
Practitioners argue that independence and a rigorous audit process prevents impairment
of skepticism due to trust (Rennie, Kopp and Lemon, 2010). However, many enforcement
actions have involved well-designed, rigorous audits that failed to detect fraud because principles
of due care and professional skepticism were not applied (SEC, 2009). This suggests that despite
mixed results of prior studies, decision makers at the SEC are sensitive to the possibility that
objectivity may be impaired by the length of the auditor-client relationship. Thus, the following
hypothesis is proposed:

H3:

There is a positive association between auditor tenure and the likelihood that
the SEC will hold the auditor accountable for a lack of professional
skepticism.
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Standards: Response to Elevated Risk
Suppose that an auditor has failed to detect a large-scale fraud and that the length of their
relationship with the client may have impaired their ability to be objective. Both “would” and
“could” questions can be answered affirmatively. However, assuming that the auditor performed
a quality audit, it may be unreasonable to blame them for not being skeptical enough.
Accordingly, fairness theory suggests that in addition to “would” and “could”, consideration for
whether things should have been different is essential to determining accountability.
Folger and Cropanzano (2001, p 21) note that “as with would and could judgments, a
‘should’ judgment involves using a standard.” Generally, “should” judgments consider whether a
moral or ethical principle has been violated. With regards to determining whether an auditor has
behaved inappropriately however, generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) provide a more
relevant point of comparison. In particular, SAS No. 99, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial
Statement Audit, outlines auditor responsibilities pertaining to the prevention and detection of
fraud. Section 316.46 of the auditing standard requires that auditor’s “response to the assessment
of the risks of material misstatement due to fraud involves the application of professional
skepticism in gathering and evaluating audit evidence (AU 316.46).” Specifically, auditors are
expected to perform additional audit procedures or obtain more persuasive evidence. Therefore,
in the presence of elevated levels of fraud risk, auditors should exercise heightened professional
skepticism in order to be in compliance with GAAS.
To demonstrate the operation of a “should” counterfactual, consider the previous example
of an auditor who failed to detect fraud and whose objectivity may have been impaired.
Determining whether the auditor should have behaved differently in this situation involves
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considering the existence of risks related to fraud, as required by SAS No. 99. If evidence
suggests that the audit client displayed certain risk factors suggestive of fraud, regulators would
reasonably expect that the auditor should have exercised a higher degree of skepticism.
Consequently, if individuals at the SEC perceive that the auditor did not appropriately respond to
risk factors (e.g. by modifying or qualifying the audit opinion) they may be more likely to hold
the auditor accountable for a lack of professional skepticism. This expectation is consistent with
findings that auditors are more likely to be held liable by a jury for failing to detect fraud when
they identified risk factors and even investigated for the fraud (Reffet, 2010). Thus, the following
hypothesis is proposed:

H4:

There is a positive association between the existence of fraud risk factors and
the likelihood that the SEC will hold the auditor accountable for a lack of
professional skepticism.

SAS No. 1, Due Professional Care in the Performance of Work (AICPA, 1972), states
that “in exercising professional skepticism, the auditor should not be satisfied with less than
persuasive evidence because of a belief that management is honest” (AU 230.09). However, past
examinations of enforcement actions suggest that auditors are often cited for a lack of
professional skepticism due to an over-reliance on the representations of management (Feroz,
Park and Pastina, 1991; Campbell and Parker, 1992). Although auditing standards caution that
management explanations “should ordinarily be corroborated with other audit evidence” (AU
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329.21), prior research indicates that auditors often do not confirm explanations for unexpected
differences (Hirst and Koonce, 1996; Trompeter and Wright, 2010).
The tendency to over-rely on management representations poses a significant threat to
auditor’s ability to behave skeptically, particularly because management has incentive to lie or
make false and misleading statements to the auditor. Within the context of fairness theory,
auditors should be more skeptical of clients who have an incentive to lie to them. Because
regulators have the benefit of hindsight when determining accountability, decision makers at the
SEC may be more likely to hold the auditor accountable for insufficient skepticism when there is
evidence to suggest that the client was lying to the auditor to conceal fraudulent activity8. Thus,
the following hypothesis is proposed:

H5:

There is a positive association between an accusation that the client lied to
the auditor and the likelihood that the SEC will hold the auditor accountable
for a lack of professional skepticism.

Research Design

Methodology for Data Collection
The sample for this study includes all AAERs between 1998 and 2011which name either
an individual auditor or an audit firm as a respondent in the case of an alleged fraud. For each

8

Although a reasonable expectation would be that all companies accused of fraudulent financial reporting would
also be accused of lying to their external auditor, this is not actually the case. Other common violations include
maintaining overly aggressive positions regarding estimates (e.g. Bally Total Fitness) or failing to provide support
for financial statement numbers (Pegasus Wireless Corporation).
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case of fraud, multiple AAERs naming individual auditors and/or the audit firm are considered to
represent one observation. For example, in the case of fraudulent financial reporting at Adelphia
Communications, enforcement actions were filed against the external audit firm, Deloitte &
Touche LLP, as well as individual members of the engagement team, including the partner and
the senior manager. However, for the purposes of this study, the enforcement actions were
treated as one instance of fraudulent financial reporting where the external auditor was also held
accountable for an alleged audit failure.
I began with all enforcement actions identified by the COSO sponsored study on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting (Beasley et al., 2010). According to the findings of the original
study, the external auditor was named in 78 of the 347 fraud cases. Due to limitations regarding
the availability of enforcement actions dating before 1999, only 72 of the original 78 were still
available on the SEC’s website. Twenty-two additional observations were collected from 2008,
2009, 2010 and 2011, resulting in a total of 94. In two cases, both predecessor and successor
auditors were named in the enforcement action. These observations were split so that each of the
four audit engagements represented a separate observation, adding two observations to the
sample and bringing the total to 96. Finally, 11 observations were dropped for a lack of
information or because the auditor was named for reasons other than performing a deficient audit
(e.g. active involvement in the fraudulent scheme). The final sample included 85 instances of
fraudulent financial reporting, documented in an AAER between 1998 and 2011, where the
external auditor was named as a respondent9.

9

Generally speaking, there is a significant time lag between the actual occurrence of fraud and the date that an
enforcement action is filed in the form of an AAER. While the sample for this study was pulled from AAERs issued
between 1998 and 2009, the fraudulent financial statements were actually issued between 1991 and 2004.
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As noted by Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998), focusing on enforcement actions filed
against the SEC is not without limitation. For instance, there is a possibility that the enforcement
actions may not provide a representative sample of frauds. Carcello and Palmrose (1994) find
that instances of fraudulent financial reporting among public companies are also identified by
criminal convictions of management, outcomes of internal investigations or enforcement actions
by non-SEC regulators. However, Carcello and Palmrose (1994) also observe the existence of
SEC enforcement actions for 80% of companies with both fraud and auditor litigation. While
enforcement actions appear to capture a majority of fraud cases involving the external auditor,
analysis is also limited by the accuracy and completeness of the data (Beasley et al., 2010).
However, the focus of the current study is regulator’s perceptions (i.e. the SEC) of the auditor’s
role in their investigations of fraudulent financial reporting. Thus, the completeness of AAERs
does not affect the inferences being made here.

Multivariate Framework
A multivariate model is used to examine whether the likelihood that the SEC will hold
auditors accountable for a lack of professional skepticism in fraud-related enforcement actions is
consistent with a fairness theory framework:

where,
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PS = An indicator variable equal to 1 when an auditor is cited for a lack of professional
skepticism and equal to 0 otherwise.
MAG = the aggregate dollar value of fraudulent misstatements divided by the total assets of the
company for the period that the last fraudulently stated financials were issued.
COMMON = An indicator variable equal to 1 when the fraudulent scheme is considered to be
commonly-occurring and equal to 0 otherwise.
TENURE = the natural log of the length of the relationship between the audit firm and the client
in years.
RISK = An indicator variable equal to 1 when the auditor is noted to have been aware of the
elevated risk of fraud and equal to 0 otherwise.
LIED = An indicator variable equal to 1 when the client is accused of having lied or made false
or inaccurate representations to the auditor and equal to 0 otherwise.
CHAIRMAN = An indicator variable representing the Chairman of the SEC at the time that the
first AAER was issued against an individual auditor or audit firm (1 = Levitt, 2 = Pitt, 3 =
Donaldson, 4 = Cox, 5 = Schapiro)
BIG4/5 = An indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor or audit firm involved represented a BIG
4 accounting firm (Arthur Andersen included).

The dependent variable is measured as (1) enforcement actions citing the auditor for a
lack of skepticism and (0) enforcement actions which cite the auditor for other violations. In both
cases, an unqualified opinion was issued on fraudulent financial statements. However, the model
predicts that the SEC’s determination to hold the auditor accountable for a lack of professional
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skepticism will be consistent with counterfactual reasoning within a fairness theory framework.
The following section further describes the test variables and control variables.

Independent Variables
H1 and H2 pertain to the magnitude and type of fraud, respectively. The magnitude of the
fraud is measured as the dollar amount of the misstatement, relative to the total assets of the
company for the period that the last fraudulently stated financials were issued. Depending on the
fraudulent scheme, this amount may pertain to multiple accounts. For example, in AAER No.
2236, Adelphia was accused of understating debt by $1.6 billion and overstating equity by $368
million. For purposes of coding the magnitude of the fraud, these two misstatements would be
aggregated.10
The type of fraud was first coded based on the ten categories presented in Table 1. These
categories were originally developed by Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998) and then adapted
for this study by removing categories which did not appear in the current sample and making a
few additions. The first 8 categories are consistent with the original taxonomy developed by
Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998) and are as follows: (A) fictitious revenues, (B) premature
revenue recognition, (C) misclassifications or (added) improper recognition of transactions, (D)
fictitious assets and/or reductions of expenses/liabilities, (F) omitted or improper disclosures, (G)
equity fraud and (H) related party transactions. Categories for (I) cookie jar reserves and (J)
improper capitalization were added based on the fraudulent schemes appearing in this sample.
10

While some of this information could arguably be collected from company filings on the Edgar database (e.g.,
magnitude of restatement or auditor tenure), the enforcement action, as documented by the AAER, is considered to
be the best resource for information perceived by the SEC to be important in determining whether to take action
against the auditor in the first place.
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The test variable included in this model however, pertains to whether or not the type of
fraudulent scheme involved was considered to be commonly occurring. Therefore, this variable
is measured as the presence (1) or absence (0) of commonly occurring frauds. Based on prior
research (Bonner, Palmrose and Young, 1998; Loebbecke, Eining and Willingham, 1989), the
most frequent types of frauds involve (A) fictitious revenues, (B) premature revenue recognition
and (E) overvalued assets or undervalued expenses/liabilities. However, as can be noted from the
frequencies presented in Table 1, frauds related to (B) premature revenue recognition only
occurred in 18.8 percent of the cases examined in this study. Thus, only categories related to (A)
fictitious revenues and (E) overvalued assets or undervalued expenses/liabilities are considered
to be commonly-occurring (> 50 percent).
To address H3, a test variable is included for the length of the relationship between the
audit firm involved and the audit client, in years and as noted in the AAER. To capture whether
the auditor was believed to be aware of specific risk factors pertaining to the alleged fraud or
generally aware of an elevated risk of fraud (H4), AAERs were reviewed for specific mention of
whether the auditor was believed to have been aware of specific risk factors or an elevated risk
of fraud. A test variable is coded as equal to 1 when the auditor is noted to have been aware of
the elevated risk of fraud and equal to 0 otherwise. Per review of the description of the fraudulent
scheme provided in the AAER, another variable is set equal to 1 when the client is accused of
having lied or made false or inaccurate representations to the auditor (H5) and equal to 0
otherwise.
Control variables related to the regulatory environment and they size of the audit firm
involved were also included in the model. The views and affiliations of the Chairman of the SEC

47

can be expected to affect all regulatory decisions made during their tenure. Therefore, a control
variable is included to indicate which of five Chairmen was in office at the time that the first
AAER was issued against an auditor in an alleged fraud case. The five Chairmen include Arthur
Levitt, Harvey Pitt, William Donaldson, Christopher Cox and Mary Schapiro. Table 1 presents
the time periods during which each held the position of Chairman. A control variable was also
included to indicate whether the individual or firm named in the AAER was associated with a
Big 4/5 audit firm. Due to the larger size of these firms, they are likely to have considerably
more resources at their disposal. Intuitively, regulators may hold these larger firms to higher
standards of audit quality or they may be hesitant to pursue enforcement actions against firms
with formidable legal resources.

Results

Descriptive Statistics
Of the 85 enforcement actions where the auditor is named as a respondent, 69.4 percent
cite a lack of professional skepticism as an audit deficiency. This is consistent with claims that
professional skepticism is often a leading cause of audit failure (Carmichael and Craig, 1996;
PCAOB, 2008; Nelson, 2009; SEC 2009). Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample.
For alleged frauds where the auditor was cited for a lack of professional skepticism (59
cases), the average total assets of the client was $7.57 billion, the average magnitude of the fraud
was $610 million, the average length of the fraud was 2.9 years and the average length of the
auditor-client relationship was 4.6 years. Of those 59 cases, 71.2 percent involved a commonlyoccurring fraudulent scheme, 79.7 percent noted that the auditor was actually aware of an
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elevated risk of fraud and 49.2 percent involved a client accused of lying or providing false and
misleading statements to the auditor. Comparatively, of the 26 cases where the auditor was not
cited for a lack of professional skepticism, the client’s average assets were $2.15 billion, the
average magnitude of the fraud was $564 million, the average length of the fraud was 2.7 years
and the average length of the auditor-client relationship was 3.53 years. Overall, 84.6 percent of
the cases involved a commonly-occurring fraudulent scheme, 42.3 percent alleged that the
auditor was aware of the risk of fraud and 19.2 percent involved a client accused of lying to the
auditor.
Consistent with prior research (Bonner, Palmrose and Young, 1998; Loebbecke, Eining
and Willingham., 1989), Table 1 reveals that the most commonly-occurring fraudulent schemes
in this sample include (A) fictitious revenues and (E) overvalued revenue/assets and or
undervalued expenses/liabilities. Although Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998) and Loebbecke,
Eining and Willingham (1989) also identified category (B), premature revenue recognition, as
commonly occurring, it only appeared in 18.8 percent of the AAERs in this study’s sample.
However, exclusion of category (B) from the commonly-occurring schemes did not yield
significantly different results.
Table 3 presents the breakdown of audit deficiencies identified in the sample. All
citations for a failure to exercise sufficient skepticism were accompanied by a citation for a
failure to exercise due professional care. As the auditing standard pertaining to due professional
care (SAS No. 1) contains the requirements for professional skepticism, this is unsurprising.
Other audit deficiencies that were frequently noted were a failure to corroborate/verify
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management representations (37.6 percent), a failure to obtain sufficient, competent evidence
(75.3 percent) and a failure to perform standard or required audit procedures (40.0 percent).
Table 4 presents a correlation matrix of the 16 audit deficiencies. A review of these
correlations reveals that a citation for a lack of professional skepticism is highly correlated with
three other audit deficiencies – (2) failure to exercise due professional care, (3) failure to
corroborate/verify management representations and (5) failure to obtain sufficient competent
evidence. This finding is also consistent with the definition of professional skepticism provided
by SAS No. 1, which states that a skeptical auditor “should not be satisfied with less than
persuasive evidence because of a belief that management is honest (AU 230.09)” and should
“consider the competency and sufficiency of the [collected] evidence (AU 230.08).”
Hypothesis Testing
A logistic regression model was fitted to the data to test the study hypotheses. These
results are presented in Table 5. Overall, the model predicts the likelihood that an auditor will be
cited for a lack of professional skepticism significantly better than the intercept-only, or null,
model (χ2=21.85, p=0.01). The Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test yielded a χ2 of 3.85
and was insignificant (p>0.05), suggesting that the model fit the data well. R2 indices, indicated
by the Cox and Snell (R2=0.24) and the Nagelkerke statistics (R2=0.33), also suggest that the
model is a good fit.
The logistic regression model uses the independent variables to predict whether an
auditor will be cited for a lack of professional skepticism in an enforcement action. Table 6
presents the observed and predicted frequencies for lack of professional skepticism citations by
logistic regression, with a cutoff of 0.50. According to Table 6, the model used in this study
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correctly predicted that an enforcement action would include a citation for a lack of professional
skepticism 85.5 percent of the time. This represents the sensitivity of the model to the
independent variables. Comparatively, the model correctly predicted that an enforcement action
would include a citation for something other than a lack of professional skepticism 42.3 percent
of the time, representing specificity. The prediction for enforcement actions against the auditor
where insufficient skepticism was cited as a reason for audit failure was more accurate than the
prediction of the opposite. The false positive rate was below 30 percent (24.2 percent) and the
overall correction prediction was 71.6 percent. These results further demonstrate the goodnessof-fit of the logistic regression model.
H1 and H2 predict that the likelihood of an auditor being cited for a lack of professional
skepticism would be positively associated with the magnitude of the fraud and the fraudulent
scheme employed (i.e. whether it was considered “commonly-occurring).” While results (Table
5) suggest that the magnitude of the fraud (MAG) is positively related to the dependent variable
(β=0.17), the relationship is not significant (Wald’s χ2=1.02, p=0.31). Whether a commonlyoccurring fraudulent scheme had been employed (COMMON) was unexpectedly found to be
negatively associated with the dependent variable (β=-0.98), but was also an insignificant
relationship (Wald’s χ2=1.83, p=0.18). Thus, the results do not support the predictions of H1 and
H2. Within the context of fairness theory, it does not appear that the “would” counterfactual –
“Would things have been less injurious had the fraud been detected?” or “Would the auditor have
been more likely to detect the fraud had they behaved more skeptically?” – is relevant to
regulator’s determination that an auditor has failed to exercise sufficient skepticism. In other
words, auditors associated with frauds of lesser magnitude or rare fraudulent schemes are no
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more likely to be cited for insufficient skepticism than when the fraud is of significant magnitude
or involves a commonly-occurring fraudulent scheme.
H3 predicted that the length of the auditor-client relationship would be positively
associated with the likelihood that an auditor would be cited for a lack of professional
skepticism. However, the results suggest the relationship between TENURE and the dependent
variable (β=-0.01) is negative and insignificant (Wald’s χ2=0.01, p=0.98). Thus, it does not
appear that regulators are sensitive to the number of years an auditor has been involved with a
client when determining whether to hold the auditor accountable for a lack of professional
skepticism. Although H3 is not supported, the “could” counterfactual might also be extended to
other factors in the audit environment that could have impaired the auditor’s ability to behave
skeptically. For instance, providing non-audit services to audit clients is often criticized for
impairing auditor independence and objectivity (Frankel, Johnson and Nelson, 2002). Stephen
Cutler, Director of the Division of Enforcement for the SEC, stated that “non-audit work allies
the audit firm with management, potentially undermining the skepticism necessary to the
performance of a rigorous audit (SEC, 2002).” However, due to the time-lag between the
occurrence of fraud and the issuance of an enforcement action (approximately 5 years), and the
limited availability of audit fee data (only available after 2002), it is outside the scope of this
study.
H4 predicted that the likelihood of an auditor being cited for a lack of professional
skepticism would be positively associated with whether the auditor was perceived to have been
aware of risk factors pertaining to the fraudulent scheme or more generally, aware of an overall
elevated risk of fraud at the audit client. Results support predictions of a significant positive
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association (β=1.81) between RISK and the dependent variable (Wald’s χ2=8.03, p<0.01). These
findings suggest that regulators consider information about risk that was available to the auditor
at the time of the audit when determining whether an auditor should have behaved more
skeptically. Thus, H4 is supported.
Finally, H5 predicted the likelihood of an auditor being cited for a lack of skepticism
would be positively associated with accusations that the client was accused of lying or providing
false or misleading statements to the auditor. Results also support predictions of a significant
positive relationship (β=1.37) between LIED and the dependent variable (Wald’s χ2=4.49,
p<0.05). Thus, H5 is supported.
Contrary to H4, results of H5 testing suggest that regulators may also consider
information that was not available to the auditor at the time of the audit when determining
whether more skepticism should have been exercised. This finding is notable because it is
conceivable that an auditor is sufficiently skeptical of a client who also happens to be a very
good liar. However, it appears that while regulators do not expect auditors to unfailingly detect
fraud, they have higher expectations when it comes to detecting whether a client is providing
false information.

Discussion and Conclusion
This study examines factors affecting the likelihood that the SEC will perceive auditors
to have failed in exercising sufficient professional skepticism during their audit of a client
allegedly involved in fraudulent financial reporting. Within the context of fairness theory (Folger
and Cropanzano, 2001), specific factors examined include (1) magnitude of fraudulent

53

misstatement, (2) whether a fraudulent scheme is considered to be commonly-occurring, (3) the
length of the auditor-client relationship, (4) whether the auditor is perceived to have been aware
of the elevated risk of fraud and (5) whether the client was accused of having lied to the auditor
during the course of their examination. Findings indicate that the auditor’s awareness of risk and
whether they had been lied to were both positively associated with the likelihood that the auditor
would be held accountable for a failure to exercise sufficient professional skepticism.
Fairness theory posits that when determining whether to hold the auditor accountable for
an injurious event, in this case fraud, the regulator will try to determine whether the auditor
could, would and should have behaved more skeptically. Results of this study suggest that the
“should” question is most relevant to this highly-subjective decision. In other words, in the event
that the auditor is determined to have been aware of fraud risk factors or in the event that the
client was determined to have provided false or misleading information to the auditor, regulators
are more likely to come to the conclusion that the auditor should have exercised greater
professional skepticism during the audit.
Enforcement actions provide an opportunity to remind auditors of the requirement to
exercise skepticism when evaluating information provided by management. But it seems that if
the client is determined to have been lying to the auditors, regulators may be drawing inferences
from this information about the level of skepticism that the auditor must have exercised during
the audit. This is valuable information to auditors, who have recently expressed misgivings
regarding the basis by which regulatory bodies determine whether sufficient skepticism has been
exercised (APB, 2011).
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Overall, the findings of this study are limited by the information documented within the
enforcement releases, available on the SEC website. There may be instances where information
that existed at the time of the investigation was simply not documented in the enforcement
action. However, the absence of such information would not be expected to preclude the findings
of this study.
As discussed above, this study provides valuable information to both regulators and
auditors regarding how their actions are being perceived in either direction. Future research is
needed to better understand how regulators can more consistently and fairly determine whether
sufficient skepticism has been exercised towards fraudulently stated financial statements.
Research should also examine how auditors can more visibly demonstrate sufficient skepticism
in audit workpapers and during formal investigations of audit quality.
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CONCLUSION
Overall, this dissertation addresses issues pertaining to professional skepticism that are
currently relevant to the auditing profession as a whole. First, competing perspectives of
professional skepticism – neutral versus presumptive doubt – were considered and questions for
future research were posed to examine whether asking auditors to adopt alternative perspectives
of skepticism may have implications for audit efficiency and effectiveness. Next, research
questions were identified which consider how the nature of the auditor-client relationship may
threaten an auditor’s ability to maintain an attitude of professional skepticism, particularly with
regards to fraudulent financial reporting. Finally, an examination of enforcement actions against
auditors examined how professional skepticism is defined from a regulator’s perspective.
It should be noted that all of these issues seem to share a common theme – that there is a
clear lack of agreement amongst academics, practitioners and regulators regarding what it means
to be professionally skeptical. As a result of this disagreement, there are many questions which
beg for further examination. For example, should a skeptical auditor be neutral or presume some
level of doubt regarding the possibility of misstatement or fraud? Is it possible to maintain
neutrality, or does the nature of an auditor’s relationship with their client threaten their ability to
ever be truly skeptical of management? Are some auditors more susceptible to these threats than
others? How do regulators evaluate skepticism?
In the preceding chapters, several avenues for future research were proposed, mainly to
address some of the implications of adopting one perspective of skepticism over another. While
auditing standards have historically recommended that auditors maintain a neutral frame of mind
throughout the audit, extremely low rates of fraud detection (< 1%) by external auditors have
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raised eyebrows regarding whether auditors should forget neutrality and presume the worst (i.e.,
adopt a presumptive doubt position) when it comes to the likelihood of fraud (Beasley et al.,
2001). As with any notable change to auditing standards or requirements, there are likely to be
implications of a stricter, presumptive doubt definition of professional skepticism. Adopting a
presumptive doubt perspective of professional skepticism could raise the bar for the amount of
evidence needed to support the opinion (Bell, Peecher and Thomas, 2005) and may result in
unnecessary expense (Shaub and Lawrence, 2002; Nelson, 2009). Therefore, due diligence is
required to determine whether the benefits of such a change outweigh the costs. In this case, the
greatest cost is the risk is to audit efficiency.
In order to understand the benefits of a presumptive doubt perspective, it would be
helpful to first understand how a neutral perspective of skepticism may be compromised. A
common example of insufficient skepticism is a tendency for the auditor to exhibit an
overreliance on management representations. This is consistent with criticisms that the nature of
the auditor-client relationship leaves the auditor susceptible to unconscious bias in favor of the
client (Bazerman, Morgan and Lowenstein, 1997). Essentially, it may be impractical to expect
that an auditor will be able to maintain neutrality when evaluating information provided to them
by a client with whom they have a close, positive working relationship.
This possibility is particularly concerning with regards to the auditor’s assessment of
fraud risk. Current auditing standards pertaining to fraud (SAS No. 99) require auditors to assess
management attitudes towards fraud as one of the three components of the fraud triangle. While
auditors are expected to increase the risk of fraud if those attitudes indicate a high-risk of
fraudulent activity, the standard also instructs them to disregard dispositional characteristics
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which suggest a low risk of fraud (e.g. honesty, integrity, etc.). The concern is that when
management attitudes do not appear to pose a high risk of fraud, auditors’ will be less skeptical
of the possibility that the financial statements are misstated due to fraud. Furthermore, Wilks and
Zimbelman (2004) warn that auditors may even overlook other risk factors which indicate high
risk related to opportunities and incentives to commit fraud. A similar concern exists pertaining
to the importance of a particular audit client to the profitability of the firm. In order to retain the
client and preserve the auditor-client relationship, the auditor may be unconsciously susceptible
to client-favoring bias. Therefore, research is needed not only to determine whether neutrality is
compromised by the auditor-client relationship, but also whether the auditor’s sensitivity to other
indications of a high-risk of fraud is reduced.
A final issue pertaining to the lack of precision in defining professional skepticism is
evidenced by the disconnect between what regulators perceive to be a lack of skepticism and
what auditors perceive to have been sufficient. An examination of enforcement actions against
auditors reveals that regulators are more likely to cite auditors for a lack of professional
skepticism when the auditor was perceived to have been aware of elevated risk and whether
client management was accused of having lied to the auditor. This is consistent with a
counterfactual reasoning approach, whereby regulators determine whether the auditor should
have been more skeptical when determining whether to hold them accountable for insufficient
skepticism.
These results provide auditors with extremely valuable information regarding how to
demonstrate to regulators that they have been sufficiently skeptical. First of all, auditors may
want to improve documentation of the procedures done to address existing risk factors. Although

58

auditors are expected to exercise skepticism with regards to high risk, the possibility remains that
they may still fail to detect instances of fraudulent financial reporting. However, they should be
able to demonstrate that they appropriately responded to those risks and did everything they
could do with the information that they had at the time. Further research should examine what
constitutes adequate documentation of skeptical behavior.
Second, the results of this study provide further evidence that an overreliance on the
representations of management is a real problem in the auditing profession. Regulators appear to
interpret evidence that a company had previously lied or provided false information to their
external auditors as an indication that the auditors were not paying attention. Although the
difficulties involved in detecting fraud, particularly when faced with collusion, have been
recognized by regulators, it is clear that auditors are expected to be more aware of when they are
being lied to. The profession may want to reconsider when and if the representations of client
management can be used as valid audit evidence. If anything, auditors should be aware that if a
client is later determined to have provided false information to the auditor, they may be more
likely to be held accountable for a failure to behave skeptically.
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APPENDIX: FIGURES AND TABLES
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Figure 1: Potential Threats to Efficiency and Effectiveness
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The above model is adapted from Folger and Cropanzano’s (2001, p 4) Fairness Theory Model of Accountability.

Figure 2: Evaluating Professional Skepticism in Terms of Fairness Theory
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Table 1: Frequency of Observations by Category of Fraudulent Scheme
The taxonomy shown below was adapted from Bonner, Palmrose and Young (1998)
Fraudulent Scheme
A
B
C
D
E
F
G
H
I
J

Fictitious Revenues
Premature Revenue Recognition
Misclassifications or Improper Recognition of Transactions
Fictitious Assets and/or Reductions of Expenses/Liabilities
Overvalued Revenues/Assets and/or Undervalued Expenses/Liabilities
Omitted or Improper Disclosures
Equity Fraud
Related Party Transactions
Cookie Jar Reserves
Improper Capitalization
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Number
28
16
8
22
45
3
2
9
1
1

Percent
67.1%
18.8%
9.4%
25.9%
52.9%
3.5%
2.4%
10.6%
1.2%
1.2%

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Auditor Cited for a Lack of
Professional Skepticism?
Total # of cases
Client’s total assets
Magnitude of fraud ($)
Auditor tenure (years)
Length of fraud (years)
Involved a commonly-occurring scheme
Auditor aware of risk
Client accused of lying to auditor
Chairman of the Board:
Arthur Levitt (7/27/93 – 2/9/01)
Harvey Pitt (8/3/01 – 2/17/03)
William Donaldson (2/18/03 – 6/30/05)
Christopher Cox (8/03/05 – 1/20/09)
Mary Schapiro (1/27/09 – Present)
Respondent:
Audit firm
Individual auditor
Big 4/5 firm

Overall
85
$5.83 billion
$596 million
4.3 years
2.9 years
75.3%
68.2%
40.0%

Yes
59
$7.57 billion
$610 million
4.6 years
3.0 years
71.2%
79.7%
49.2%

No
26
$2.15 billion
$564 million
3.5 years
2.7 years
84.6%
42.3%
19.2%

18.8%
18.8%
24.7%
21.2%
16.5%

18.6%
15.3%
23.7%
18.6%
23.7%

19.2%
26.9%
26.9%
26.9%
0.0%

34.1%
97.6%
43.5%

40.7%
98.3%
42.4%

19.2%
96.2%
46.2%
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Table 3: Frequency of Observations by Audit Deficiency
Audit Deficiency
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Failure to exercise sufficient professional skepticism
Failure to exercise due professional care
Failure to corroborate/verify management representations
Inadequate independent verification
Failure to obtain sufficient, competent evidence
Lack of independence or objectivity
Failure to perform standard or required audit procedures
Failure to properly supervise subordinates
Did not have adequate technical training and proficiency
Failure to respond appropriately to identified risks
Intentionally altered/destroyed work papers to conceal audit failures
Failure to obtain sufficient understanding of internal controls
Failure to issue accurate/proper audit reports
Failure to properly plan the audit
Failure to notify management or the board of directors of illegal acts
Failure to obtain written representation letter from management

65

Number
59
55
32
3
64
7
34
16
7
11
9
7
24
15
2
3

Percent
69.4%
64.7%
37.6%
3.5%
75.3%
8.2%
40.0%
18.8%
8.2%
12.9%
10.6%
8.2%
28.2%
17.6%
2.4%
3.5%

Table 4: Correlation Matrix of Audit Deficiencies
Refer to Table 3 for a description of each category of audit deficiency.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1

1

2

0.47**

1

3

0.25*

0.14

1

4

0.01

0.13

0.25*

1

5

0.51**

0.43**

0.33**

0.11

1

6

-0.08

0.12

-0.14

-0.06

-0.13

1

7

-0.14

-0.02

0.26*

0.23*

0.02

0.02

1

8

-0.01

0.09

0.07

0.07

0.07

-0.04

0.10

1

9

0.11

0.21

-0.06

0.18

0.17

0.07

0.11

0.08

1

10

0.18

0.05

0.21

0.06

0.06

-0.12

0.04

-0.10

0.14

1

11

-0.10

-0.15

-0.19

-0.25*

-0.25*

-0.10

-0.05

0.23*

0.04

-0.02

1

12

0.11

-0.05

0.21

0.17

0.17

-0.09

0.02

-0.04

0.38**

0.27*

0.04

1

13

-0.04

-0.10

-0.11

-0.01

-0.01

-0.19

-0.03

-0.10

0.01

-0.09

-0.05

0.10

1

14

0.17

0.01

-0.04

0.27*

0.27*

-0.03

-0.06

0.09

0.20

0.10

0.04

0.31**

0.40**

1

15

-0.07

-0.05

0.04

-0.09

-0.09

-0.05

0.03

0.12

0.24*

0.17

0.20

0.24*

0.08

0.13

1

16

-0.01

-0.02

-0.02

0.11

0.11

-0.06

-0.03

0.07

0.18

0.12

0.35**

0.41**

0.16

0.25*

0.40**

Significance levels: ** < 0.01, * < 0.05
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16

1

Table 5: Logistic Regression Analysis
Predictor

β

S.E. β

Wald’s χ2

df

p

Constant
(H1) MAG
(H2) COMMON
(H3) TENURE
(H4) RISK
(H5) LIED
CHAIRMAN
BIG4

-0.18
0.17
-0.98
-0.01
1.81
1.37
0.14
-0.92

0.97
0.17
0.73
0.37
0.64
0.65
0.23
0.66

0.04
1.02
1.83
0.01
8.03
4.49
0.40
1.90

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0.85
0.31
0.18
0.98
0.01**
0.03*
0.53
0.17

χ2

df

p

Test

eβ
(odds ratio)
0.83
1.19
0.38
0.99
6.10
3.95
1.16
0.40

Overall model evaluation
21.85
7
0.01**
Goodness-of-fit test
Hosmer & Lemeshow
3.85
8
0.87
R2 = 0.24 (Cox and Snell), 0.33 (Nagelkerke)
Note: This table presents the results of a logistic regression analysis of the likelihood that enforcement actions
against auditors will cite a lack of professional skepticism as the reason for audit failure, where the dependent
variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 when an auditor is cited for a lack of professional skepticism and equal to
0 otherwise.
All variables are defined as follows: PS = An indicator variable equal to 1 when an auditor is cited for a lack of
professional skepticism and equal to 0 otherwise. MAG = the aggregate dollar value of fraudulent misstatements
divided by the total assets in the final fraud year. COMMON = An indicator variable equal to 1 when the fraudulent
scheme is considered to be commonly-occurring and equal to 0 otherwise. TENURE = the natural log of the length
of the relationship between the audit firm and the client in years. RISK = An indicator variable equal to 1 when the
auditor is noted to have been aware of the elevated risk of fraud and equal to 0 otherwise. LIED = An indicator
variable equal to 1 when the client is accused of having lied or made false or inaccurate representations to the
auditor and equal to 0 otherwise. CHAIRMAN = An indicator variable for the chairman of the board at the issuance
of the first AAER against the auditor (1 = Levitt, 2 = Pitt, 3 = Donaldson, 4 = Cox, 5 = Schapiro). BIG4 = An
indicator variable equal to 1 if the auditor or audit firm involved represented a BIG 4/5 accounting firm (Arthur
Andersen included).
Significance levels: ** < 0.01, * < 0.05
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Table 6: Observed and Predicted Frequencies
Predicted
Observed
Not Cited for a Lack of PS
Cited for a Lack of PS
% Correct
Not Cited for a Lack of PS
11
15
42.3%
Cited for a Lack of PS
8
47
85.5%
Overall % Correct
71.6%
Based on a cutoff point of 0.5, this table presents the observed and predicted frequencies of enforcement actions
against auditors where the reason for audit failure is a lack of professional skepticism.
Note: Specificity = 11/(11+15)% = 42.3%. Sensitivity = 47/(8+47)% = 85.5%. False negative = 8/(8+11)% = 42.1%.
False positive = 15(15+47)% = 24.2%.
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